The Nordic region is hopefully not facing a conventional war. Still, we live in a time where hybrid threats, cyberattacks, sabotage, communication outages and climate-driven extreme events create a new form of operational uncertainty. In this environment, the experiences from Ukraine are more relevant than many might think.
Grid Resilience – the Underestimated Strength
One of the main reasons Ukraine still operates a functioning power system is its ability to repair quickly, reroute flows and leverage a decentralised system. When a high-voltage line is destroyed, it does not take days or weeks to restore power – alternative pathways are often established within hours. Mobile repair teams are deployed with spare parts, temporary poles, mobile transformers and battery support. There is no time for lengthy analyses or planning processes. The system must function – and it does, because the organisation is trained to improvise, adapt and act swiftly.
Decentralised production has also been crucial. Because Ukraine has power plants spread across large geographic areas – nuclear, hydro, gas and coal – it is difficult to cripple generation as a whole. And when regions lose connection to one another, local areas can often remain operational because production, consumption and control have a degree of independence. Ukraine also has ambitious plans – aiming to become Europe’s leading hub for green energy.
Integration with the European power market, ENTSO-E, was another turning point. When Ukraine was synchronised with the EU system in 2022, the country gained access to power imports, frequency support and essential reserve capacity. What began as a technical project became a security mechanism in practice.
For Nordic grid companies, this highlights three clear lessons: build redundancy into the grid, strengthen local production and flexibility, and ensure technological systems that support rapid change and dynamic operation.
Communication – the System’s Glue
A modern energy system cannot operate without communication. Ukraine has endured repeated attacks on fibre, mobile networks and radio links. Yet they manage to maintain operations because communication is never dependent on a single channel. In practice, the country operates parallel systems: fibre, microwave, radio, mobile networks – and when everything else fails, satellite.
The use of satellite systems such as Starlink has been especially critical. They cannot support time-critical SCADA protection, but they keep field personnel connected, provide access to maps and documentation, and enable fault management even in areas where all other infrastructure is down.
The reminder for Nordic grid operators is clear: communication is not a background service – it is the operational nervous system. Redundancy, independent channels and emergency communication are not “nice to have”, but essential for resilient operations.
The Cloud as the Foundation for Digital Resilience
One of the most underestimated parts of the Ukrainian energy miracle is how the cloud saved the IT structure. When the first missile strikes hit data centres, authorities, grid operators and energy companies remained digitally operational. The most critical data had already been moved out of the country, stored in secure cloud environments with geographic redundancy and advanced security architecture.
There is a difference between operations and operational support. SCADA and protection systems naturally need to be close to the grid. But everything that does not require millisecond latency – measurement data, MDM, analytics, planning, event logs, customer systems and collaboration – works better, more securely and more flexibly in the cloud.
This is the same philosophy behind Embriq’s products, operated in robust, secure AWS environments within the EU. The solutions are not dependent on local data centres, local telecom providers or single points of failure. In a crisis, users can connect from anywhere, and data remains just as accessible as before.
Ukraine has stated that the cloud was not a technology trend, but a survival strategy. This perspective should now influence grid operators in the Nordic region as well.
A New Understanding of Resilience
When we combine all these elements, the lesson becomes clear:
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Grids must be able to be repaired quickly and reconfigured flexibly.
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Production must be geographically dispersed and adaptable.
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Communication must be redundant and independent of single points of failure.
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Power markets must be interconnected to provide access to reserves and stability.
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Digital services must reside in robust, secure, international cloud environments.
This is the foundation of an energy system capable of withstanding far more uncertainty than we traditionally plan for. Resilience is no longer only about strong poles and solid protection systems – but about agile organisations, diversified infrastructure and digital systems that remain operational even when the local environment collapses.
Ukraine shows that it is possible to operate an energy system under pressure far beyond what we in the Nordic region can imagine. The lesson is not that we should prepare for war, but that we should prepare for an era where uncertainty, disruption and digital threats are part of normality.
And in that world, the cloud, redundancy, communication and rapid adaptation become just as important as cables and transformers. This is the landscape future grid operators must navigate – and now is the time to prepare.